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Abstract: This article offers a trajectory of humanitarian communication that suggests a 
clear, though not linear, move towards post-humanitarian styles of appealing. Drawing on 
empirical examples, the article demonstrates that the post-humanitarian sensibility breaks 
with the emotional repertoire of pity and privileges a short-term and low-intensity form 
of agency, which is no longer inspired by an intellectual agenda but momentarily engages 
us in practices of playful consumerism. Whereas this move to the post-humanitarian 
should be seen as a reaction to a much-criticised articulation between politics and 
humanitarianism, based on universal morality and grand emotion, it is also a response to 
the mediatized global market in which humanitarian agencies operate today. The article 
concludes by reflecting on the political and ethical ambivalence at the heart of this new 
style of humanitarian communication, which offers both the tentative promise for new 
practices of altruism and the threat of cultural narcissism.  
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Post-humanitarianism: 
Humanitarian communication beyond a politics of pity 
                   
Introduction  
Humanitarian communication seems to be under a constant threat of de-legitimization. 
From the early ‘shock effect’ images denounced for dehumanising the sufferer (Lissner 
1979, 1981; Benthall 1993) to ‘positive imagery’ campaigns accused of glossing over the 
misery of suffering (Lidchi 1999, Smillie 1995) to the more recent critiques of the 
commodification of solidarity (Nash 2008; Vestergaard 2008), no manner of representing 
distant others as a cause of public action seems to do justice to the moral claim of 
suffering.  
In this paper, I approach humanitarian communication as the rhetorical practices  
of trans-national actors that engage with universal ethical claims, such as common 
humanity or global civil society, to mobilize action on human suffering. Focusing on the 
trajectory from ‘shock effect’ to ‘humanitarian branding’ appeals, I show how each style 
of appealing represents suffering as a cause for emotion and action and how, in so doing, 
it proposes distinct forms of public agency towards vulnerable others. My argument 
suggests a clear, though not linear, move from emotion-oriented to post-humanitarian 
styles of appealing that tend to privilege low-intensity emotions and short-term forms of 
agency. This shift, I argue, should be seen as a contemporary attempt to renew the 
legitimacy of humanitarian communication – one that abandons universal morality and 
draws on the resources of the media market in which humanitarian organisations operate 
today (Cottle and Nolan 2007).  
 
The crisis of pity 
Boltanski (2000: 1-6) approaches the question of de-legitimization not simply as a 
problem of humanitarian communication but as a problem in the very relationship 
between humanitarianism and politics. He sees the problem as a consequence of the 
tactical use of humanitarian argument in the service of political interest that often 
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discredits the appeal to suffering as a universal moral cause. For my purposes, his 
argument is helpful not so much as a critique of contemporary global politics but as an 
analytical insight into the very nature of the political.  
Contemporary Western politics, founded as it is on an Enlightenment discourse of  
the public good, draws its legitimacy not simply from its adherence to principles of 
democratic governance but also from its adherence to a universal conception of welfare; 
from the articulation of justice with pity. Whereas this moral emphasis on pity has 
enabled, partially but significantly, the alleviation of suffering among large populations 
in modern times, it has simultaneously established a dominant discourse about public 
action that relies heavily on the language of grand emotions about suffering – a reliance 
that, in Arendt’s famous critique, displaces politics into the ‘social question’; it displaces 
the long-term concern with establishing structures of justice with the urgent concern to 
doing something for those who suffer (1990: 59-114).  
What Boltanksi calls the ‘crisis of pity’ today can, therefore, be understood  
broadly as the crisis of a particular conception of politics, where the justification of 
public action in the name of universal ethics takes place by resort to an emotion-oriented  
discourse of suffering: a language of indignation or guilt that blames the perpetrators, 
examples ranging from peaceful civil protests to military state interventions, or the 
language of sentimental gratitude that evokes appreciation for the benefactors, as in 
disaster relief or development aid initiatives (1999: 35-54).  
The inadequacy of this conception of the political, I would argue, cannot be  
solely understood as an inadequacy of political practice, that is as the failure of global 
institutions to address injustice or alleviate suffering; on the contrary, despite criticisms, 
humanitarian NGOs continue to be an important part of global governance structures and 
to nourish the moral imagination of the West (Calhoun 2008: 73-97). Instead, the 
inadequacy of this conception of the political can be understood, at least partly, as an 
inadequacy of the discourse of pity. Specifically, it can be understood as the inadequacy 
of this discourse to activate grand emotions, such as indignation and guilt or sympathy 
and gratitude, and so to sustain a legitimate claim for public action on suffering:  
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Why is it so difficult nowadays to become indignant and to make 
accusations or, in another sense, to become emotional and feel sympathy – 
or at least to believe for any length of time, without falling into 
uncertainty, in the validity of one’s own indignation or one’s own 
sympathy? (Boltanksi 2000: 12).  
 
In this paper, I approach humanitarian communication as a mode of public  
communication that both reflects and reproduces the inadequacy of this conception of the 
political, insofar as it aims at establishing a strategic emotional relationship between a 
Westerner and a distant sufferer with a view to propose certain dispositions to action 
towards a cause.  
My argument develops as follows. First, I discuss the critique of humanitarianism  
in the ‘shock effect’ and ‘positive image’ campaigns as a critique of grand emotions 
resulting to a reflexive turn in humanitarian communication (Critiques of humanitarian 
communication). Second, I turn to an analytical discussion of three contemporary appeals 
(by Amnesty International and the UN World Food Programme, 2006-07) in terms of 
aesthetic quality and moral agency (An emerging style of humanitarian communication)i. 
My discussion illustrates an emerging style of appealing that, though not replacing 
emotion-oriented styles, breaks with pity in favour of a potentially effective activism of 
effortless immediacy; in so doing, it abandons the appeal to suffering as a universal moral 
cause and challenges the relationship between humanitarianism and politics as we know 
it so far (Towards a post-humanitarian sensibility).  
 
Critiques of humanitarian communication 
The history of humanitarian communication can be productively recounted as a history of 
the critique of its aesthetics of suffering. Specifically, it can be seen as a critique of the 
social relationships that the imagery of suffering establishes in the course of proposing a 
certain emotional connectivity between spectator and sufferer. Two types of critique 
prevail in this account: a critique of the emotions of guilt and indignation that are 
associated with the ‘shock’ aesthetics of early campaigns and a critique of the emotions 
of empathy and gratitude that are associated with the aesthetics of ‘positive image’ 
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campaigns (Dogra 2007). Both critiques acknowledge that the aesthetics of suffering is 
catalytic in moving the spectator to action but challenge the ethical discourse that 
underpins emotional motivations to action in each type of appeal.  
My discussion of these critiques relies on the assumption that studying  
humanitarian communication in terms of its aesthetic properties, that is in terms of the 
ways in which it uses imagery to establish emotional connectivity between spectator and 
sufferer, can provide insights into the moral proposals to action that this form of 
communication makes possible in our culture. Drawing on a view of humanitarian 
communication as performative, enacting paradigmatic forms of feeling and acting 
towards suffering, this analytical approach assumes that such communication does not 
simply address the public as a pre-existing collectivity that awaits to engage in action but 
it has the power to constitute this collectivity as a body of action in the process of 
visualising and narrating its cause (Boltanski 1999: 35-54).  
Far from implying that publics become what campaigns intend them to become in  
a deterministic manner, the performative view emphasizes the role of humanitarian 
communication as ‘moral education’: as a series of subtle proposals of how we should 
feel and act towards suffering, which are introduced into our everyday life by mundane 
acts of mediation (television, internet or urban advertising) and shape our longer-term 
dispositions to action by way of ‘habituation’ (Chouliaraki 2008: 831-47). Let me now 
discuss the two types of appeals, ‘shock effect’ and ‘positive image’.  
 
‘Shock effect’ appeals: Early examples of humanitarian communication,  
including the paradigmatic campaigns of Oxfam 1956 and Red Cross 1961 (see Appendix 
1), rely on a documentary mode of representing suffering in its plain reality. Oxfam’s 
1956 mother-child visual complex constitutes the classic imagery of the ‘ideal victim’ 
(Hojer 2004). The lack of eye contact suggests that the mother is unaware of being caught 
in camera, yet the picture is focalized on her arm reaching out to an imaginary benefactor 
in a plead for help, whereas the apprehensive urgency in her emaciated face testifies to 
the despair of her conditionii. The Red Cross 1961 campaign also relies on raw realism to 
depict human bodies in an extreme state of starvation. This image is a composition of 
people devoid of individualizing features – biological, such as their age and sex or social, 
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such as clothing. They are half-naked, exposing emaciated rib cases, arms and legs. 
Captured on camera, these body parts, passively sitting in a row as they are, become 
fetishized (Hall 1997: 223-280): they do not reflect real human bodies but curiosities of 
the flesh that mobilize a pornographic spectatorial imagination between disgust and 
desire (Lissner 1981: 23).  
Both campaigns are ‘victim-oriented’: they focus on the distant sufferer as  
the object of our contemplation. In so doing, they establish a social relationship anchored 
on the colonial gaze and premised on maximal distance between spectator and suffering 
other (Hall 1992/2001: 275-310; Silverstone 2006: 118-23). This social relationship of 
distance, produced by the contrast between the bare life of these sufferers and the civility 
of healthy bodies in the West, is associated with the affective regime of ‘guilt, shame and 
indignation’ (adapted from Cohen 2001:214). Thrown into relief by the circulation of 
‘shock effect’ images in contexts of affluence and safety, social distance operates as a 
moralising force through a logic of complicity (Douzinas 2000: 153-4). On the one hand, 
complicity evokes the legacy of the colonial past of the West and, with it, the European 
responsibility in systematically disfranchising distant others through imperial rule –  a 
sense of historical complicity that figures in the consciousness of Westerners as a 
sentiment of collective guilt (le Sueur & Bourdieu 2001: 148-84). On the other hand, 
complicity renders the spectator a witness of the horrors of suffering and, in so doing, 
makes of our inaction a personal failure to take responsibility for their misfortune – a 
sense of everyday or banal complicity to distant suffering that taps into feelings of shame 
(Ahmed 2004: 105 for the guilt-shame distinction).  
This logic of complicity is a primary source of emotion in ‘shock effect’  
communication: failure to act is failure to acknowledge our historical and personal 
participation in perpetuating human suffering. Guilt and shame, however, pivotal 
emotions as they may be in this type of imagery, do not exhaust the communicative 
reservoir of ‘shock effect’ appeals. In its most powerful manifestation, complicity 
transforms these emotions, often regarded as introverted modes of feeling towards 
suffering, into the more extrovert and assertive emotion of indignation. Here, the social 
relations of complicity become political: they are externalized from the individual to 
society (Boltanksi 1999:61-3). Consequently, the figure of the persecutor is objectified in 
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the form of unequal structures of power and action is linked to the imperative of social 
justice: outrage into action is Amnesty International campaigns’ slogan during the early 
1990s. 
There is, however, an inherent tension in forms of communication that rely on 
complicity. In evoking guilt, shame or even indignation, ‘shock effect’ appeals seek to 
turn grand emotions into action, by, at least partly, identifying the figure of the persecutor 
in the very audiences they address as potential benefactors – aren’t we, after all, part of 
this Western legacy, participating in the systemic inertia that reproduce the power 
relations between West and the rest? Guilt and indignation, in this sense, inform an 
ambivalent form of moral agency that both presupposes the Western spectator’s 
complicity to world poverty, collectively and individually, and at the same time enacts 
this complicity in the power relations that it seeks to expose and redress (Hattori 2003b: 
164-5). The critique of distance, which the ‘shock effect’ imagery establishes between 
those who watch and those who suffer, captures precisely this ambivalence that makes 
the West the benefactor of a world that it itself manages to symbolically annihilate.  
The popular resistance to ‘shock effect’ imagery, known as compassion  
fatigue or the ‘I’ve seen this before’ syndrome (Moeller 1999:2), may not directly draw 
on this theoretical critique of emotions, but it does reflect it in the form of two more 
pragmatic risks: the ‘bystander’ effect and the ‘boomerang’ effect. The former risk refers 
to people’s indifference to act on suffering as a reaction towards negative emotion that 
ultimately leaves people feeling powerless, as Cohen puts it, a sense of the situation so 
utterly hopeless and incomprehensible that we cannot bear to think about it (2001: 194). 
The latter risk refers to people’s indignation not towards the imagined evil-doer but 
towards the guilt-tripping message of the ‘shock effect’ campaigns themselves - for 
bombarding you with material that only makes you feel miserable and guilty  (Cohen 
2001:214). Rather than facilitating the call to public action on suffering, these risks may 
ultimately undermine it. 
 
‘Positive image’ appeals: Developing in a responsive relationship to ‘shock effect’ 
campaigns, ‘positive image’ ones also rely on photorealism to represent the reality of 
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sufferingiii. The difference is that these campaigns reject the imagery of the sufferer as a 
victim and focus on the sufferer’s agency and dignity.  
This is evident in Oxfam campaigns such as Save the Children (1991; Appendix  
2), which sums up two key characteristics of the ‘positive image’ style: i) it personalizes 
sufferers by focalizing the appeal on distinct individuals as actors (for example, as 
participants in development projects) and ii) it singularizes donors by addressing each 
one as a person who can make a concrete contribution to improve a sufferer’s life (for 
example, through child sponsorshipiv). It is the presence of the benefactor, rather than the 
implied persecutor, which is instrumental in summoning up the emotional regime of 
‘empathy, tender-heartedness and gratitude’ in ‘positive image’ appeals (adapted from 
Cohen 2001: 216-18).  
Rather than complicity, the moralising function of this affective regime  
relies on ‘sympathetic equilibrium’, a logic of representation that orients the appeal 
towards a responsive balance of emotions between the sufferer and the spectator as 
potential benefactor (Boltanski 1999:39). Specifically, the sympathetic equilibrium is 
established through the ways in which the imagery of suffering provides subtle evidence 
of the sufferer’s gratitude for the (imagined) alleviation of her suffering by a benefactor 
and the benefactor’s respective empathy towards the grateful sufferer.  
On the one hand, the personalization of the sufferer (in the photos of smiling  
children, in the sentimental texts of child sponsorship or in the eye witness accounts of 
aid workers) articulate such sense of fine-tuning between the donor and the receiver of 
aid. This use of bilateral emotion not only empowers the sufferer, giving her a voice, but 
further animates the donor’s ‘modal imagination’: our capacity to acknowledge in the 
suffering other a shared quality of humanity absent in ‘shock effect’ appeals. On the other 
hand, the singularization of the donor as an individual who can make a difference in a 
practical way similarly seeks to empower audiences by showing how our actions may 
lead to change.   
The representational practices of ‘positive image’ appeals, in this sense, address  
the evils of ‘shock effect’ appeals: people’s sense of powerlessness towards distant 
suffering (the bystander effect) and people’s resistance to the negativity of campaigns 
themselves (the boomerang effect). Importantly, however, these representational 
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practices are also closely articulated with the new spirit of interventionism in the 
humanitarian project, which goes beyond relief and aspires to transform the economic 
and political structures that can support a better life for vulnerable others. Imagery and 
the vision it informs are thus inseparable parts of this project; as the 1989 Commission 
for Images puts it, the problem of images and perceptions cannot be separated from the 
methodology of interventionv. 
Yet, even if these spectacles manage to provide us with a deeper  
understanding of global divisions, they conceal crucial aspects of their complexity. They 
fail, for example, to critically address the hegemony of neo-liberal politics in world 
economy, the competitive governance milieu in which NGOs operate, the conditions of 
marketization and mediatization on which their legitimacy rests, the problematic links 
between NGOs and local regimes as well as the lack of local infrastructures often leading 
to failures of development. In suppressing these complex dimensions of development, 
‘positive’ appeals seem to lack a certain reflexivity as to the limits of the interventionist 
project to promote sustainable social change (Sen 1999; 2006; Hattori 2003a). 
It is the social relationship emerging out of spectacles of hope and  
self-determination, embedded as they are in the power structures of development,  that 
the critique of sameness describes as a classic instance of ‘misrecognition’, the 
euphemistic concealment of systemic power relations by the image of smiling children 
(Bourdieu 1977:183–97). Central to misrecognition is the focalization of ‘positive  
image’ appeals on the emotions of gratitude and fellow-feeling. Dialectically linked to 
empathy, through the logic of the sympathetic equilibrium, gratitude relies on the social 
logic of the gift between unequal parties, which helps perpetuating the unequal relations 
of development. This is so, insofar as the gift without reciprocation, as is development 
aid, binds the grateful receiver into a nexus of obligations and duties towards the 
generous donor. At the same time, the generosity and tender-heartedness of the West 
unite donors in a community of virtue that discovers in its own fellow-feeling for distant 
others a narcissistic self- contentment (Hattori 2003b). Criticism against ‘positive image’ 
appeals centres precisely on this ambivalent moral agency that their imagery makes 
possible. While it appears to empower distant sufferers through discourses of dignity and 
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self-determination, such imagery simultaneously disempowers them by appropriating 
their otherness in Western discourses of identity and agency.  
This critique of identity essentially addresses the ways that benevolent emotions  
operate as instruments of power, to the extent that they render others the perpetual objects 
of ‘our’ generosity. Simultaneously, the critique reflects more pragmatic risks of 
misrecognition that feed into an increasing compassion fatigue for ‘positive images’. 
First, there is the risk of positive examples of ‘aid in action’ to be misrecognized as fully 
addressing the problems of the developing world and, therefore, lead to inaction on the 
grounds that ‘everything is already taken care of’; this is, what we may call, a 
misrecognition of the systemic relations of inequality (Small 1997: 581-93). Second, 
there is the risk that the plethora of smiling child faces may be misrecognized as children 
like ‘ours’, leading to inaction on the grounds that ‘these are not really children in need’; 
this is a misrecognition of the social relations of difference and identity that positive 
images gloss over (Cohen 2001:183-4). Rather than enabling action on suffering, the 
misrecognition risks inherent in ‘positive image’ campaigns deepen the crisis of pity by 
introducing suspicion in the representation of suffering – a ‘how do I know this is real?’ 
sensibility further amplified by the public’s awareness of the capacity of the media to 
manipulate images of suffering (Cohen & Seu 2002:187-201).   
   
Despite differences, the two types of appeal, ‘shock effect’ and ‘positive images’,  
have similar orientations: they share a reliance on photorealism and a belief in the power 
of grand emotions. Seeking to confront us with distant suffering in two of its most 
authentic forms, shocking destitution and hopeful self-determination, humanitarian 
communication nonetheless seems suspended between distance and identity. The former 
animates the affective regime of guilt and indignation to lead us into action, but such 
negative emotions tie action to our own complicity in global injustice and run the risk of 
fatigue and apathy. The latter animates the emotional constellation of gratitude and 
tender-heartedness to persuade us to act, but such positive emotions tie action to a view 
of development as a gift, which glosses over asymmetries of power and runs the risk of 
denying the need for action on the grounds that it may be unnecessary or, even, unreal.  
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An emergent style of humanitarian communication  
The field of humanitarian communication seems to be a field of inherent tension. The 
threat of de-legitimization, mentioned in the Introduction, occurs in this contradictory 
field, where the reality of suffering appears through different norms of realism and 
activates different emotions without, however, managing to transcend its contradictions – 
without managing to construe suffering as the cause of legitimate emotion and action for 
any length of time, in Boltanski’s quote. 
It is in the light of this inherent instability that we need to examine the  
emergence of a style of humanitarian appeal that departs from previous ones in terms of 
aesthetic quality, problematizing photorealism, and in terms of moral agency, breaking 
with the traditional registers of pity as motivations for action (guilt and indignation, 
empathy and gratitude). This style of appealing differs from the previous ones in that it 
does not seek to resolve the contradictions of humanitarian communication but to put 
them forward in an explicit way.  
The implications of this shift go beyond the domain of communication  
and return us to the relationship between humanitarianism and politics, insofar as this 
style of appealing reformulates the conception of public action on suffering that this 
relationship presupposes. The emerging style, I argue, makes possible a new public 
sensibility that i) disengages public action from pity, that is from the activation of grand 
emotion towards suffering and ii) engages the reflexivity of the spectator, inviting us to 
rely on our own judgement as to whether public action is possible or desirable.  
I focus on the Wold Food Programme’s ‘No food diet’ appeal  (2006) and the Amnesty 
International ‘Bullet. The Execution’ and ‘It is not happening here now’ (2006/07) 
appeals (see Appendix 3)vi. I discuss each in terms of their aesthetic quality and moral 
agency.  
 
Aesthetic quality 
The central aesthetic feature across all appeals is multi-modal juxtaposition: the contrast 
between different elements of each campaign’s meaning-making system. Each appeal is 
constituted by particular forms of juxtaposition between i) verbal and visual modes, in the 
WFP ‘No food diet’, ii) visual form and content in Amnesty International’s  ‘Bullet. The 
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execution’ and iii) textual and physical space, in Amnesty’s ‘It’s not happening here but 
now’. 
The No Food Diet, World Food Programme (WFP), appeal relies on the contrast  
between language and image. Imagery focuses on an African hut, showing the mother 
who makes food and puts her children to bed, and evokes an aura of everyday 
domesticity – further enhanced by the reassuringly intimate and familiar tone of the 
voiceover that recites a recipe. Yet, the talk provides a different framing for the visual: 
the recipe refers to the old trick of fooling children to sleep in the expectation of a dinner 
that is never to come - the ‘no food diet’. The voiceover continues by contrasting the 
effectiveness of our familiar ‘Atkins diet’ with the ‘no food diet’ and concludes that 
…guess what… it is so effective that 25.000 people on the no food diet die everyday.  
At this point, the visual shifts to African people looking frontally at the camera;  
domesticity has now given way to the more traditional imagery of silent figures to be 
contemplated at. The film’s last frame is WFP’s website address with a subtle invitation 
to act: www.wfp.org/donate. This contrast between language and image works effectively 
to situate a Western diet discourse in the context of African famine and, in so doing, it 
manages to throw into relief another contrast between a lifestyle of scarcity and a lifestyle 
of abundance. The rhetorical effect is a Bakhtinian ‘tragic irony’, a sense of the absurdity 
of our cultural habits echoed in the appeal’s two voices: theirs and ours. Unlike ‘shock 
effect’ appeals, this ironic double-voicedness does not work to remind us of the radical 
otherness of the African poor, but of the otherness of our own cultural habits against the 
background of their struggle for daily survival.    
The Bullet. The Execution, Amnesty appeal relies on a different juxtaposition  
between image form and content. In terms of form, the appeal consists of a 3-dimensional 
animation technique, which simulates a prisoner’s execution. Three formal properties are 
important: colours, dark and subdued, rhythm, slow motion, and design, an exaggerated 
realism that focuses on the detail of human figures, such as body posture, muscle 
movement, gaze, but also on the detail of objects, such as the jerking of the gun, the gun 
fire, the vector of the bullet shooting through. The effect of these formal properties is 
hyperreality, a perfected sense of the real that can only be fictional (Baudrillard 1988:43-
4). In terms of content, the story is about the rescuing of a prisoner’s life through the 
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paper shield of petition sheets signed by Amnesty supporters. As we follow the bullet 
moving slowly towards the prisoner’s body, petition papers start flying through and hover 
in space between the bullet and the body. They are being ripped by the bullet but 
ultimately succeed in protecting the body – then there is an extreme close up to the 
prisoner’s eye and the sigh of his relief. The statement Your petitions are more powerful 
than you think, followed by Amnesty’s e-address (www. AmnestyInternational.fr), is the 
only linguistic text of the appeal. There is a sense of extreme intensity in this silent 
sequence, which endows the piece with an ecstatic sense of temporality where time 
stands still and a minute seems to last a lifetime (Barker 2002:75), a temporality that we 
often associate with the visual genres of adventure fiction. 
Finally, the It is not happening here…Amnesty appeal relies on yet  
another form of juxtaposition, ‘chronotopic reversal’ (Bakhtin 1986:10-59). This refers to 
the reversal of the categories of space and time, where the imagery of distant suffering 
comes to haunt some of the most banal spaces of our everyday life: the neighbourhood 
street or the bus stop. The campaign consists of 200 images of suffering from Iraq, 
Myanmar, Liberia and other places set in transparent advertizing frames across a number 
of cities in Switzerland – but quickly spread around the world through the phenomenal 
media response to the campaign. Devoid of background, these transparent images appear 
strangely disembodied, as-if they suddenly emerged from a remote reality to interrupt our 
safe lifeworld. The only bit of language, It is not happening here but now, functions to 
frame this optical illusion as a play between physical and textual space, blurring the 
boundaries between the two and bringing about the unsettling sense of urgency that 
chronotopic reversal can so powerfully activate. At the same time, Amnesty’s e-address, 
standing unobtrusively at the bottom of the poster, gently invites us to visit the 
organization’s website as the access point for engagement with this cause 
(www.AmnestyInternational.sw).  
 
In so far as these appeals still rely on the force of the imagery of suffering to  
construct the humanitarian cause, they do not drop photorealism. They do, however, shift 
away from photorealism as authentic witnessing towards photorealism as yet another 
aesthetic choice by which suffering can be representedvii. This occurs through the use of 
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juxtaposition that works to estrange us from a range of popular visual genres, such as 
digital games or the advertizing genre of the trompe l’oeil, and introduces the imagery of 
suffering as the new content of these genres. In inviting us to engage with their textual 
games, these appeals come to remind us that we are confronted not with the ‘truth’ of 
suffering but with acts of representation (Vestergaard 2009).  
 
Moral agency 
Rather than simply breaking with the aesthetic conventions of ‘shock effect’ and ‘positive 
image’ appeals, these ones importantly also break with the moral mechanism of those 
appeals, whereby one thing, the immediacy of suffering, is assumed to be translated into 
another, action on suffering. Which are the properties of moral agency in this style of 
communication where suffering becomes self-consciously aestheticized? I focus on two: 
the technologization of action and the de-emotionalization of the cause.  
Technologization of action: A key feature of these campaigns is the simplicity of  
their proposals to action: click your mouse. This figures modestly as a slash/donate in the 
WFP web-address (www.wfp.uk.co/donate) or simply as a reference to Amnesty’s 
addresses (eg. www.AmnestyInternational.fr). Such technologization of action 
significantly simplifies the spectator/user’s mode of engagement with the humanitarian 
cause: all we need to do is click under the ‘sign petitions’ or ‘make donations’ links. 
There are two dimensions to this simplification.   
The first dimension of simplification has to do with the use of the internet as the  
vehicle for public action on distant suffering. Speed and on-the-spot intervention, both 
features of online activism celebrated as catalysts for a new democratic politics (Bennett 
2003), are here instrumental in addressing the key problem of the humanitarian 
sensibility mentioned earlier: the non-sustainability of grand emotions towards a cause 
for any length of time. The simplification of action, in this sense, is not only an inevitable 
but also a desirable dimension of technologized humanitarian communication. More 
ambivalently, however, this no-time engagement with technology suggests that 
expectations of effortless immediacy, the most prominent element of contemporary 
consumer culture, is increasingly populating the moral imagination of 
humanitarianismviii. 
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The second dimension of simplification has to do with the absence of  
justification in the appeals: there is simply no mention of the reasons why action may  
be important. As opposed to the other two styles of appealing that draw on universal 
discourses of ethics, this style abandons universal morality. What it communicates 
instead is the organizational brand itself: the WFP and AI web-addresses constitute the 
only linguistic text of the appeals. Responding to the communication risks of emotion-
oriented campaigns that ‘tell’ the public what they should feel (risks of cynicism, fatigue 
and suspicion), this style of campaigning relies instead on signalling the strong ‘brand 
equity’ of these organizations, that is their solid image and international reputation (Slim 
2003: 8-12)ix. Insofar as it strategically replaces moralistic exhortation with brand 
recognition, thereby moving from an explicit marketing of suffering as a cause towards 
an implicit investment on the identity of the humanitarian agency itself, this emergent 
style can be seen as inspired by practices of corporate branding (Vestergaard 2008). 
Regarded as the most effective form of corporate persuasion, branding works through 
ellipsis: it is not the verbalization of argument but the ‘aura’ of the brand  that sustains 
the relationship between product and consumer (Arviddson 2006: 73-94).  
In this spirit, the branding of suffering abandons visual realism, grand  
emotion and the question of why in order to tap into the readily available assets of 
historical organizations, such as WFP or Amnesty,  and to allow consumption-savvy 
publics themselves to engage with brand associations of solidarity and care as the 
autonomous creators of brand meaning. An important consequence of this highly 
technologized and elliptical style of humanitarian communication is the transformation of 
the affective registers of suffering that these appeals produce. 
The de-emotionalization of the cause: All three appeals inevitably articulate  
certain affective dispositions towards suffering, since without emotion no appeal to  
action could be legitimate. These dispositions rely on the traditional affective regimes  
of humanitarian communication: guilt and indignation or empathy and gratitude. These 
regimes, however, do not appear as immediate emotions that may inspire action but 
rather as objects of contemplation to be reflected upon. 
The ‘No food diet’ campaign relies on irony, a textual trope characterized  
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by a high degree of self-consciousness that sets Western concerns about weight control 
against the drama of survival in Africa – echoing perhaps Bob Geldof’s words, ‘it is 
absurd that in a world of plenty people die of want’. Rather than relying on the 
contemplation of the other, this appeal relies on the contemplation of the self, through 
imagery that creates a distance from our own taken-for-granted habits in a world of 
abundance. This ironic self-reflexivity conveys a sense of suppressed guilt that gently 
hints at the affective regime of ‘shock effect’ appeals, in the final visual frame of African 
people gazing at the camera. These images, however, do not seek to shock us by exposing 
the extremities of ‘bare life’ but only perhaps to remind us of the absurdity of injustice at 
the heart of our conditions of existence.  
The ‘Bullet. The Execution’ campaign relies on the sublimation of the  
moment of execution, where the battle of good versus evil works to evoke a suppressed 
reference to heroic sacrifice: the spectator’s noble power to do good, to save the live of a 
conscience prisoner. Again, this is not the heroism of indignant denunciation that has, in 
the past, so powerfully inspired movements of international solidarity against tyrannical 
regimes. It is rather a dispassionate emotional regime, where the act of saving a life is 
coded into the aesthetics of digital gaming and the proposal to action is disconnected 
from a rhetoric of justice: your petitions are more powerful than you think. 
Finally, the ‘It is happening now…’ campaign uses optical illusion to  
interrupt our ‘chronotopic unconscious’, the naturalized assumptions about where we are 
and how we orient ourselves to the world by placing the horrific event at the centre of our 
ordinary visual experience (Holquist 2002:141-2). What the unexpected presence of 
torture and near-death next to us evokes is a fleeting reference to compassion, an 
empathetic sentiment of urgency associated with the classic Christian figure of the Good 
Samaritan - the stranger who stops to provide aid to the wounded, without verbalizing 
justification or expressing emotion (Boltanski 1999: 5-9 for the pity-compassion 
distinction).  
In summary, the uses of irony, hyperreality and optical illusion contribute  
to the constitution of moral agency in this emerging form of campaigning, insofar as they 
manage to refract grand emotions into, what we may call, low intensity affective regimes 
– regimes that insinuate the classic constellations of emotion towards suffering but do not 
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quite inspire or enact them. Guilt, heroism and compassion re-appear not as elements of a 
politics of pity, partaking a grand narrative of affective attachment and collective 
commitment, but as de-contextualized fragments of such narrative that render the 
psychological world of the spectator a potential terrain of self-inspection.  
 
Towards a post-humanitarian sensibility 
It is this humanitarian sensibility, characterized by textual games, low intensity emotional 
regimes and a technological imagination of instant gratification and no justification, that 
we may call post-humanitarian communicationx. Whereas still depending on realistic 
imagery (of the poor, the wounded or the about-to-die), the key feature of post-
humanitarianism lies precisely in loosening up this ‘necessary’ link between seeing 
suffering and feeling for the sufferer and in de-coupling emotion for the sufferer from 
acting on the cause of suffering. Central to the post-humanitarian sensibility is the 
particularization of the cause, whereby the representation of suffering becomes 
disembedded from discourses of morality and relies on each spectator’s personal 
judgment on the cause for action.  
It is this contrast between the traditional, universalising styles of campaigning and  
the contemporary, particularizing ones that renders the post-humanitarian style vulnerable 
to critiques of commodification. In requiring no time commitment to the cause of 
suffering, humanitarian branding obeys a market logic that is unable to defend a political 
vision of justice and social change or to inspire a sustained form of moral agency vis a vis 
suffering othersxi. Whereas the commodification critique is fully justified in its suspicion 
towards the strategic disembedding of suffering from a morality of justice, it overlooks 
the fact that previous styles of campaigning were also informed by a similar tension 
between politics and the market - between awareness-raising and fund-raising (Lissner 
1979). Indeed, the dominant conception of the political, introduced earlier, that connects 
the legitimization of public action with the production of grand emotion is not itself 
devoid of economic interest. Rather, both ‘shock effect’ and ‘positive image’ campaigns 
are situated squarely within a market logic of persuasion, insofar as they also 
communicate emotion to their own ends. The production of negative or positive emotion, 
in these appeals, are at once articulations of political passion at the service of legitimizing 
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public action on suffering and simultaneously strategies of the market at the service of 
legitimizing the humanitarian brand itself.  
The difference then between emotion-oriented and post-humanitarian   
campaigns lies essentially in the principle each style uses to secure legitimacy: moral 
universalism in the former and reflexive particularism in the latter. The particularization 
of the cause in post-humanitarian campaigns should be seen, in this light, as a market 
response to the universalization of the cause in the emotion-oriented ones. In portraying 
sufferers as powerless victims or as dignified agents, these campaigns intend to produce 
either a universal discourse of justice, through negative emotions that ultimately de-
humanize the sufferer, or a universal discourse of empathy, through positive emotions 
that eventually appropriate the sufferer in a world like ‘ours’. Neither of these two forms 
of moral universalism ultimately manages to sustain a legitimate claim to action on 
suffering.   
From this perspective, rather than claiming that the post-humanitarian style  
commodifies communication, it would be more productive to claim that this style shifts 
the terms on which the commodification of humanitarianism occurs today. Whereas the 
politics of pity in earlier appeals assumes that emotions and their universal discourses 
operate in a moral economy of abundance, an economy where everyone can, in principle, 
feel for and act on distant suffering in an unrestricted manner, post-humanitarian appeals 
assume instead that emotions operate, in fact, in an economy of scarcity where the 
emotional wealth of one agent necessarily comes at the expense of another (Gross 
2006:79).  
It is the recognition of this tension between the proliferation of moralizing  
discourses, prescriptive and perhaps inauthentic as they are, and the public’s bounded 
ability to feel and act on distant others, which lies at the heart of humanitarian branding 
and its new style of communication. By foregrounding the act of representation rather 
than emotional affiliation towards suffering, this style acknowledges that compassion 
fatigue lies not so much in the excess of human suffering that transcends our individual 
capacity to feel for or act on it, but rather in the excess of discourses of morality around 
which we are called to organize our feelings and action towards suffering.  
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Conclusion: a new altruism or cultural narcissism? 
To come full circle to the question of de-legitimization, I propose to understand the post-
humanitarian style as a specific response to the crisis of pity that reclaims the legitimacy 
of humanitarian appeals by removing grand emotion from the call to action on suffering. 
It does so by recourse to the market practice of branding, which technologizes and 
particularizes the premises for action, rendering such action irrelevant to the ethical 
discourses that have traditionally informed public agency on suffering.  
As a consequence, the post-humanitarian style offers an alternative vision of  
agency – one whose political implications are deeply ambivalent. In activating low 
intensity emotions, this style proposes a conception of action that ‘cleanses’ public 
communication of sentimentalist argument and introduces individual judgment as our 
primary resource for engaging with suffering as a cause. This focus on individual 
judgement further foregrounds the power of personal rather than collective action in 
making a difference in the lives of vulnerable others. What this form of agency asserts, in 
particular, is the capacity of popular culture to expand the domain of politics towards 
mundane tactics of subversion, such as momentary estrangement and playful self-
reflection, through the media tropes of irony, hyperreality and illusion (Harold 2004: 189-
211); but also the capacity of new media to engage individual users in fleeting and 
effortless, but potentially effective, forms of solidarity activism (Bennett 2003: 17- 38). 
The post-humanitarian sensibility thus comes to challenge traditional conceptions of 
agency, where such activism tends to presuppose a certain subordination of the self to a 
higher moral cause and promotes instead a different disposition, where a playful 
engagement with the self without visionary attachments may also prove to make a 
difference to the lives of vulnerable others (Gross 2006: 110).  
At the same time, however, in capitalizing on the reflexive resources of the  
individual without offering a moral justification for action, the post-humanitarian style 
confronts the public it addresses with a mirror of their own world. In so doing, it runs  
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the risk of failing to operate as an agent of ‘moral education’ – to go, that is, beyond 
everyday playfulness so as to inspire and re-constitute the moral agency of Western 
publics along the lines of civic virtues such as solidarity with and care for vulnerable 
others. The danger then in removing the moral question of ‘why’ from humanitarian 
communication may be lying with perpetuating a political culture of communitarian 
narcissism - a sensibility that renders the emotions of the self the measure of our 
understanding of the sufferings of the world at large.  
Embodied in the metaphor of the modern ‘homo sentimentalis’, this sensibility  
favours a public culture of private emotionality and indulgent self-inspection (Illouz 
2007: 36-9), which makes it almost impossible to engage, emotionally and practically, 
with those who suffer outside the community of the West. What this narcissistic 
sensibility fails to recognize is that the public circulation of emotion and action, far from 
distributed in random patterns of scarcity and abundance, is actually inscribed on 
systematic patterns of global inequality and their hierarchies of place and human life – 
hierarchies that divide the world in zones of Western comfort and safety and non-
Western need and vulnerability (Chouliaraki 2006: 206-18).  
In conclusion, whereas the post-humanitarian style manages to reflexively address  
the limitations of a politics of pity, detaching the communication of suffering from grand 
emotion, it has, in one and the same move, also suppressed the articulation of ethical 
discourse on public action. This has important implications for humanitarian 
organizations’ practices, calling for a closer examination of their strategic communication 
choices. The main implication is that, rather than challenging the historical patterns of 
injustice inherent in the moral economy of scarcity, which these organizations have so 
accurately diagnosed, the post-humanitarian style may be reinforcing them. Out of an 
interest to renew the legitimacy of humanitarian calls to action, such appeals may be 
feeding back into a dominant Western culture, where the de-emotionalization of the 
suffering of distant others goes hand-in-hand with the over-emotionalization of our safe 
everyday life.    
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i My empirical focus is on European appeals across causes (poverty and human rights) and across 
media (television, internet and urban advertising space). In the European context, appeals by 
Oxfam (eg ‘Be humankind’, UK 2008); Save the Children (eg ‘Saving children’s lives’, Sweden 
2008) and Red Cross (‘Aqua’, Denmark, 2006-7) demonstrate a similar move away from an 
emotion-oriented style of communication (Vestergaard 2008 for the Danish Red Cross 
campaign).  
 
ii Red Cross image photographed by Werner Bischoff in Bihar, India (1951) for ‘Life’ magazine, 
where it appeared with the caption ‘Sir, we are dying’.  
 
iii ‘Shock effect’ and ‘positive image’ appeals should not be seen as following a linear 
development from the former to the latter. Despite criticisms against ‘shock effect’ imagery, 
evidence suggests that they are still a most effective style of appealing to the urgency of action – 
hence their continuing presence in the public communication of suffering. Both ‘shock effect’ and 
‘positive image’ appeals are today dominant styles of humanitarian communication, co-existing 
and often complementing one another. 
 
iv Whereas Oxfam prefers community to child sponsorship, the latter spearheads the campaign 
communications of other international NGOs such as ActionAid, Plan, Children SOS, and World 
Vision. 
 
v In the ‘Code of conduct on images and messages relating to the 3rd world’ (April 1989), where  
NGOs were moreover advised to be attentive to messages that oversimplify or over-concentrate 
sensational aspects of life in the 3rd world.  The Code has been under revision since 2004, in the 
light of surveys showing that, even though 60% of NGOs claim to have become more sensitive in 
their representational practices, there is little statistical difference in the actual imagery of 
suffering used in the past ten years.   
 
vi The WFP appeal (BBC World television; now available on WFP website, You Tube and other  
networking sites); The AI ‘Bullet. The Execution’ appeal (French television, 2006, You Tube and 
other social websites). The ‘It is not happening here… ’ poster campaign (Swiss urban 
advertising, May 2006; multiplied online visits to AI by 20 and brought the number of hits per 
day to hundreds of millions globally; source: www.osocio.com).  
 
vii For theoretical perspectives on witnessing see Oliver (2004:79-88); Ellis (2001:2); Frosh & 
Pinchevski (2008); Peters (2001: 709).    
 
viii Fenton (2008: 37-57) for the risks of technological activism; Stevenson (2006) for a cautionary 
argument on ‘technological citizenship’; Livingstone (2004:10) et al for young people’s use 
patterns of civic/political websites; Bauman (2001: 118-129) and Tomlinson (2007: 124-33) for 
risks in the ‘culture of speed’. 
 
ix AI ‘Bullet. The execution’: advertising agency, AOCPROD, Paris (Golden Lion at Cannes 
Festival in ad production, 2006); ‘It is not happening here…’: advertising agency, Walker 
Werbeagentur, Geneva (Silver Lion at the Cannes Festival in ad production, 2007); ‘No food diet’ 
appeal: part of a series of WFP outsourced productions, which includes celebrity interviews and 
on-location visits to Africa as well as the use of Hollywood film trailers such as ‘Blood Diamond’ 
(Warner Bros 2006).   
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x This definition is inspired by Mestrovic’ thesis on the post-emotional society, which argues that 
contemporary socio-political dispositions are removed from universal discourses of morality and 
are moving precisely towards a technological, low-intensity engagement with emotional states 
(Mestrovic 1997: xi-xii).  
 
xi see Mestrovic (1997); Cohen (2001:195); but Sznaider (1998: 7-25) for the co-emergence of 
commodification and humanitarian sentiment in modernity. 
